Neural Mechanisms of Bodily Self-Consciousness and the Experience of Presence in Virtual Reality by Herbelin, Bruno et al.
© 2016 Bruno Herbelin, Roy Salomon, Andrea Serino and Olaf Blanke
Bruno Herbelin, Roy Salomon, Andrea Serino and Olaf Blanke
5  Neural Mechanisms of Bodily Self-Consciousness 
and the Experience of Presence in Virtual Reality
Abstract: Recent neuroscience research emphasizes the embodied origins of the 
experience of the self. This chapter shows that further advances in the understanding 
of the phenomenon of VR-induced presence might be achieved in connection with 
advances in the understanding of the brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. 
By reviewing the neural mechanisms that make the virtual reality experience pos-
sible and the neurocognitive models of bodily self-consciousness, we highlight how 
the development of applied human computer confluence technologies and the fun-
damental scientific investigation of bodily self-consciousness benefit from each other 
in a symbiotic manner.
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5.1  Introduction
The ultimate goal of virtual reality (VR) is to produce the authentic experience of 
being ‘present’ in an artificial environment. To achieve this, VR technologies have 
been classically conceived within a cybernetic approach, placing the human subject 
at the core of a feedback control loop where multi-media technologies substitute all 
interaction with the external world. Pioneers of VR began to describe this ‘presence’ 
as the “illusion of non-mediation” (Lombard & Ditton, 1997) or the “suspension of 
disbelief” (Slater & Usoh, 1993), which occurs when the subject reports a transfer of 
presence from reality to the immersive virtual environment. This is directly linked to 
the mechanisms by which our experience of being a self in the world, termed bodily 
self-consciousness, is constructed using multisensory information.
The study of bodily self-consciousness has been based on the findings from 
altered experiences of the self, such as out of body experiences (OBE). During an OBE, 
a subject (or self) experiences states in which he/she feels as though he/she occupies 
a spatial location separated from that of his/her own physical body and perceives 
the world from a disembodied perspective. Alterations in bodily self-consciousness, 
whether of neurological origin or induced experimentally, shed light on the compo-
nents and mechanisms that structure our natural and typical sense of presence. We 
suggest here that the presence in VR relies on these mechanisms, and as such, one 
should consider scientific insights about bodily self-consciousness and its neural 
origins in order to understand how presence in a virtual environment can be achieved.
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This chapter aims to bridge the VR development and the neuroscience of self-
consciousness by showing that VR profits from concepts and knowledge developed 
in cognitive neuroscience, which help us understand and perfect the technology that 
gives rise to presence in VR environments. Additionally, it highlights that cognitive 
neuroscience benefits from the unique opportunities offered by VR technologies to 
manipulate perception and consciousness and study the brain mechanisms underly-
ing self-consciousness.
We first illustrate the close association of the origins of tele presence technolo-
gies with altered forms of self-consciousness. We then discuss attempts to establish 
models of presence in virtual reality and neurocognitive models of bodily self-con-
sciousness. Finally, we conclude by examining the reciprocal relationship between 
these fields and consider the direction of future interactions.
5.2  Tele-Presence, Cybernetics, and Out-of-Body Experience
The possibility to experience tele-presence in a distant or even an artificial reality 
was first realized when the technologies of video transmission and computer graph-
ics allowed individuals to wear displays mounted on the head and see pictures of 
a world captured at another location – or through fully generated by a mathemati-
cal computer model. Howard Rheingold experimented with this idea in Dr. Tashi’s 
Laboratory (Tsukuba, Japan, in 1990) with a remotely controlled robotic head and 
head mounted displays (HMD). At one point, turning his head as he was looking 
through the robot’s eyes, the cameras installed inside the robot caused the robot to 
turn toward his physical body. Speaking of the body he saw, Rheingold said; “He 
looked like me and abstractly I could understand that he was me, but I know who 
me is, and me is here. He, on the other hand, was there. It doesn’t take a high degree 
of verisimilitude to create a sense of remote presence” (Rheingold, 1991). Rheingold 
concluded, “What you don’t realize until you do it is that tele-presence is a form of 
out-of-the-body experience.”
It may not come as a surprise that we owe the invention of the head-mounted 
graphical displays in 1963 to a brilliant engineer and scientist Marvin Minsky who 
had an out of body experience. He indeed revealed, “One day, at age 17, I was walking 
alone at night during a snowstorm in a singularly quiet place. I noticed that the 
ground looked further away than usual, and then it seems that I was looking down 
from a height of perhaps 10 meters, watching myself crossing the field” (reported in 
Grossinger, 2006). Minsky, a pioneer in cybernetics and artificial intelligence, was a 
highly influential thinker since the invention of tele-presence and immersion systems. 
Following the cybernetic principles in which a person can be considered an ‘entity’ 
reacting to ‘inputs’ through ‘output’ channels, it was hypothesized that an ultimate 
and total mediation of all the input-output channels would lead to a replacement of 
what a person perceives as being their environment. In other words, a person could 
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be fooled into believing that the experienced situation is real if his/her mind cannot 
detect any discrepancy between the expected and the mediated outcome of their 
actions (e.g., the head-camera feedback-loop that Rheingold experienced). Using VR 
systems, which consider the human “senses as channels to the mind” and the “body 
as a communication device” (Biocca, 1997), it became possible to explore cyberspace 
and to contemplate a generalization of Minsky’s idea of tele-presence in a distant 
location (Minsky, 1980) to the broader concept of presence in an immersive virtual 
environment. Pioneers in VR soon observed that users of virtual reality systems “are 
in a world other than where their real bodies are located” (Slater & Usoh, 1992) and 
that they experience the troubling “sense of being” in a non-existing environment 
(Heeter, 1992). Interestingly, these accounts resemble Rheingold’s reference to an arti-
ficial form of “out-of-the-body experience” (Rheingold, 1991).
What exactly are out-of-body experiences (OBE) of neurological origin? An OBE is 
an autoscopic phenomenon during which people have the impression of having left 
their body, of floating above it, and of observing it from outside. During an OBE, one 
is subjected to a displacement of their point of view out of the boundaries of the physi-
cal body. OBEs may occur during epileptic seizures, but they have also been observed 
in other neurological or psychiatric conditions. They may also occur in neurologically 
healthy individuals. OBEs have even been directly evoked by administering electri-
cal stimulation to the brain during the treatment of an epileptic patient, specifically 
at the right angular gyrus (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seek, 2002). Blanke and col-
leagues proposed that an OBE involves an alteration in bodily self-consciousness 
(BSC) caused by selective deficits in integrating multisensory body-related informa-
tion into a coherent neural representation of one’s body and of its position in extra-
personal space (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seek, 2004; Blanke, 2012). In the nor-
mally functioning brain, self-consciousness arises at different levels, ranging from 
the “the very simple (the automatic sense that I exist separately from other entities) 
to the very complex (my identity, complete with a variety of biographical details)” 
(Damasio, 2003). Blanke and Metzinger (2009) described a low-level account of the 
bodily self and termed it minimal phenomenal selfhood. Focusing on the experience 
of the bodily self, minimal phenomenal selfhood comprises three main components, 
(i) self-identification with the body as a whole (rather than ownership of body parts), 
(ii) self-location, and (iii) the first person perspective (1PP). Using this concept, an 
OBE can be described as an incoherence in the integration of 1PP, self-identification, 
and self-location. Interestingly, the alteration of the three components of BSC also 
applies to the description of tele-presence phenomenon reported by Rheingold. A 
similar parallel can also be drawn between autoscopic hallucinations (the experi-
ence of viewing one’s own body in extracorporeal space) and multimedia setups (an 
example of which is “Video Place”, an interactive installation created by Krueger in 
1985 where people play with interactive video silhouettes of themselves).
Apart from pathological cases of altered bodily self-consciousness, such as OBE 
and autoscopic hallucinations that may strike us as rather strange phenomena (see 
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also heautoscopy and feeling-of-a-presence; Lopez et al., 2008; Heydrich, Blanke, & 
Brain, 2013), it might seem quite astonishing that in most instances, we experience a 
presence inside a body and rarely question how this is achieved. Similarly, the expe-
rience of being in the world that is perceived from the perspective of the body (1PP) 
is rarely challenged in reality. It is only under the artificial mediation of perception 
induced by VR technologies that a subject questions the limits of the natural and 
usual experience of self-consciousness. What makes the condition of tele-presence 
induced by VR interesting as a phenomenon is the intangibility of those limits, with 
an experience of presence (almost) as authentic as that experienced in reality on the 
one hand and an unusual experience closer to an actual OBE on the other hand. As 
such, trying to understand the presence in virtual reality is similar to investigating the 
ability of the brain to integrate artificial perceptions into a coherent representation. 
As such, presence might better be described “as an immediate feeling produced by 
some fundamental evaluation by the brain of one’s current circumstances” (Slater, 
2009) or as the “neuropsychological phenomenon evolved from the interplay of our 
biological and cultural inheritance” (Riva, Waterworth, & Waterworth, 2004).
5.3  Immersion, Presence, Sensorimotor Contingencies, and 
Self-Consciousness
In the previous section, we highlighted similarities between the experience of tele-
presence in VR and the neurological phenomenon of OBEs, suggesting a stronger link 
between VR research on presence and neuroscientific research on self-consciousness. 
In the next section, we first consider more recent developments regarding the experi-
ence of presence in the context of VR and then focus on neuroscience research eluci-
dating its neural mechanisms.
As mentioned in Lombard and Jones (2007), various terms have been used to 
discuss the concept of presence in the 1800 articles, which the authors reviewed over 
more than twenty years. Today, the terminology benefits from these decades of refine-
ment based on which several terms have been distinctively identified. In particular, 
Slater defined ‘immersion’ as the ability of a VR system to induce an experiential dis-
placement of a person inside what is called an immersive virtual environment (Slater, 
2003). Presence should be distinguished from immersion and considered more cor-
rectly as “a ’response’ to a system of a certain level of immersion” (Slater, 2003). Com-
pared to Lombard and Ditton’s (1997) original conception of presence as the “percep-
tual illusion of non-mediation” or to the previous definition “suspension of disbelief” 
proposed by Slater and Usoh (1993), this distinction between immersion and presence 
disuntangle the concept of presence as an experience from the technological and arti-
ficial substrates that are used to generate it.
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Later, Slater introduced two concepts with an aim to establish two levels of pres-
ence (Slater, 2009), the place illusion (PI) and the plausibility illusion (Psi). The PI 
phenomenon is arising directly from the integration of multiple cues from the virtual 
environment, whereas the Psi is the result of higher-level cognitive processes accept-
ing a virtual scenario as plausible and therefore potentially real. The PI may therefore 
be more closely related to different bottom-up levels of sensorimotor immersion gen-
erated by VR, whereas the Psi acts on specific cognitive mechanisms. These distinc-
tions are fundamental for engineers to evaluate the immersive power of their systems 
and for researchers to target how to generate a more substantial experience of pres-
ence. Importantly, it is generally accepted that the key mechanism for generating the 
PI is the implementation of a set of sensorimotor contingencies (SCs) supported by 
the virtual environment. Thus, the corresponding set of valid actions available to the 
user corresponds to a given sensory feedback, and it is implemented as action-effect 
feedback loops. It is useful for programmers of VR simulation systems to understand 
that the feedback loop is not simply a design pattern but a necessary condition for 
SCs, as the richness and extent of the SCs contribute to the experience by augmenting 
the PI level in response to the subject’s exploration of the virtual environment.
To explain with greater concision its separate experiential states, Riva and 
Waterworth described the presence in VR as a three-level hierarchical process (Riva, 
Waterworth & Waterworth, 2004); (i) the proto-presence, i.e., an embodied presence 
related to the level of perception-action coupling, (ii) the core presence emerging 
from conscious and selective activity in order to integrate sensory occurrences into 
coherent percepts, and (iii) the extended presence linking the current core-presence 
to the past experience in a way that challenges the significance of the lived experi-
ence. Riva and Waterworth’s different levels of presence in VR closely correspond to 
the ‘layers of the self’ proposed by Damasio (1999), i.e., the proto-self (to which the 
proto-presence corresponds), the core-self (the core-presence in VR), and the auto-
biographical self (the extended presence in VR). To situate these levels of presence 
within the general picture of VR, Riva and Waterworth introduced additional dimen-
sions of focus, locus, and sensus (Riva, Waterworth & Waterworth, 2004; see also 
Waterworth & Waterworth, 2001). “Focus can be seen as the degree to which the three 
layers of presence are integrated toward a particular situation” and is maximal “when 
the three levels are working in concert”, i.e., proto, core, and extended presence are 
coherent. The locus dimension or “the extent to which the observer is attending to the 
real world or to a world conveyed through the media” is more about contrasting the 
virtual to the physical world. Finally, sensus (defined as “the level of consciousness 
or attentional arousal of the observer”) denotes one’s awareness of ’feeling present’ 
during immersion, and it is also referred to as the sense of presence (SoP). Estima-
tions of SoP through questionnaire have been proposed as a mean to quantify pres-
ence (see review Herbelin, 2005). However, in the same way in which “participants 
know that nothing is ‘really’ happening, and they can consciously decide to modify 
their automatic behavior accordingly” (Slater, 2009), participants are made aware of 
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the artificial nature of their feeling of presence in VR and evaluate it in comparison 
with what they think it should be in reality. To avoid this bias, a direct approach based 
on low-level bodily experience, as studied in cognitive science of self-consciousness, 
seems preferable.
This refinement of the concept of presence highlights its experiential nature and 
thus its link to aspects of consciousness, particularly bodily self-consciousness. To 
address this link further, we review selected findings on bodily self-consciousness 
and its neural underpinnings.
5.4  Presence and Bodily Self-Consciousness
A system based purely on sensory-motor contingencies cannot account for the expe-
riential nature of presence. The experience of ‘being here’ (in a physical reality or in 
VR) implies that a subject is having this experience. According to Damasio (1999), 
the minimal level of experience, also defined as the “core consciousness”, arises at 
the interplay between two components, “the organism” and “the object”. Thus, a 
pre-reflexive, non-verbal representation of the “organism” as the subject of experi-
ence, which Damasio conceptualized as the Self (i.e., the “core Self”), precedes any 
experience. Recent research in neuroscience has suggested a systematic relationship 
between the subject of experience and the specific representations of the body in the 
brain. We experience the world from the physical location and with an egocentric per-
spective of the body, which we feel as our own. The concept of minimal phenomenal 
selfhood corresponds to such a proposal of the embodied self (Blanke and Metzinger, 
2009) and of bodily self-consciousness (Blanke, 2012).
According to a prominent view in neuroscience, the embodied self is charac-
terized by two major aspects of bodily experience, i) the sense of agency, i.e., the 
subjective experience of being the author of one’s own actions, and ii) the sense of 
ownership, the feeling that this body is mine (Gallagher, 2000; van den Bos & Jean-
nerod, 2002). Both may be selectively impaired by neurological and psychiatric dis-
orders. For example, in somatoparaphrenia (typically occurs following right parietal 
brain damage), patients feel that their contralesional hand is not their own (Vallar 
& Ronchi, 2009). In the ‘Anarchic Hand’ syndrome, patients feel a loss of volitional 
control over their hand while maintaining ownership (Della Sala, 1998). The double 
dissociations observed in these disorders support the notion that agency and own-
ership rely on separate brain mechanisms. On the one hand, the brain seeks cor-
respondence between internally generated motor commands and the re-afferent 
sensory feedback caused by their consequences. Some neuroscientists believe that 
this correspondence is crucial for generating the experience of being the agent of the 
movement. On the other hand, our brain also constantly receives and integrates mul-
tisensory information from different parts of our body, and the integration of these 
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different multisensory body-related signals is assumed an important mechanism for 
generating body ownership.
Recent developments in VR have captured these basic mechanisms of bodily 
self-consciousness and used them to introduce a new and potentially more powerful 
account of VR experience, the sense of embodiment. Kilteni, Groten, and Slater (2012) 
defined it as “the ensemble of sensations that arise in conjunction with being inside, 
having, and controlling a body”. Accordingly, the sense of embodiment is generated 
in conjunction with the sense of agency, the sense of body ownership, and the sense of 
self-location. The latter is defined as a position in space where the self is experienced 
to be, according to the model of bodily self-consciousness by Blanke and Metzinger 
(2009). Kilteni and colleagues suggested that, “self-location refers to one’s spatial 
experience of being inside a body, and it does not refer to the spatial experience of 
being inside a world”; thus, it may be that self-location does not entirely correspond 
to the place illusion. Although different, sense of presence and sense of embodiment 
certainly share most mechanisms described above. It has even been proposed that 
the sense of embodiment “potentially includes the presence subcomponent” (Kilteni, 
Groten, & Slater, 2012).
Research on cognitive neuroscience has shown that critical concepts in the VR 
field, such as presence and sense of embodiment, are better understood in terms of 
neural mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Critical components of bodily self-
consciousness are associated with integrated sensorimotor and multisensory body-
related signals, generating agency, body ownership, self-location, and the first person 
perspective (see Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012). In the next sections, we 
will review major achievements in neuroscience that support this view, starting with 
studies on agency and following with research on body ownership and self-location.
5.4.1  Agency
The predominant model that reflects our sense of agency is often referred to as the 
“forward model”. Following the original idea of Von Helmholtz (1866), it posits that 
when we make a movement, our sensorimotor systems generate an “efferent copy” 
of that movement, i.e., an internal representation of the sensory consequences of the 
planned movement (Wolpert, Ghahramani & Jordan, 1995). This internal representa-
tion is compared to the actual re-afferent sensory inputs related to the action (e.g., 
visual, proprioceptive). Under normal conditions, the sensory feedback matches 
signals predicted by the efferent copy, and such a match generates the attribution of 
the action to oneself, i.e., the sense of agency (Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Jeannerod, 
2006). To experimentally test the sense of agency, neuroscientists have introduced 
systematic perturbations of the sensory (mostly visual) feedback for movements 
(Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998). Early experiments on agency used ingenious manip-
ulations, employing mirrors to achieve visuo-motor discrepancies, such as in the 
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classical paradigm proposed by Nielsen (1963), which indicated, for the first time, the 
dissociation between the unconscious monitoring of our hand motor actions and our 
sense of agency for them.
While mirror based paradigms contributed to our initial understanding of the 
sensorimotor mechanisms underlying the sense of agency, the advent of computer 
and video technology gave rise to novel possibilities to test sensorimotor mismatch. 
As the control of digitally represented outcomes (such as cursor movements) entered 
many research laboratories, several paradigms utilizing these new sensorimotor con-
tingencies appeared. The use of computers allowed the introduction of precise and 
well controlled deviations between motor actions and their visual outcomes and made 
it possible to precisely test the effect on the attribution of those actions to the self 
(David et al., 2007; Salomon, Szpiro-Grinberg & Lamy, 2011). For example, Farrer and 
colleagues (2007) joined such conflicts with functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to study brain activity in participants while controlling the movement of a 
circle along a T shaped path. In some trials, the participants had full control over the 
movement of the circle while in other trials, the computer controlled the shown trajec-
tory. The results showed that when the participants felt in control over the reproduced 
movement, this was associated with the activation of the insular cortex, an area that 
processes and integrates several bodily-related signals (Craig, 2009; Tsakiris et al., 
2007). When the participants felt no control over the movement, a different region 
was activated, specifically, the right inferior parietal cortex. This region has been 
related to many spatial functions, particularly to self-attribution of actions (Salomon, 
Malach, & Lamy, 2009; Tsakiris, Longo & Haggard, 2010) and awareness of one’s own 
actions (Lau et al., 2004; Sirigu et al., 2004). Moreover, lesions to this region may 
lead to loss of agency, as in the anarchic hand syndrome (Bundick & Spinella, 2000). 
These and other findings are consistent with the observation that the inferoparietal 
cortex is responsible (together with areas not reviewed here, such as the supplemen-
tary motor area and the cerebellum) for capturing discrepancies between the effer-
ent copy and the actual sensory consequence of actions, thus for monitoring action 
attribution (Chaminade & Decety, 2002; David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Farrer et al., 
2003; Farrer et al., 2007).
Other paradigms based on live and recorded video images of movements have also 
been employed to study the mechanisms underlying self-attribution of actions (Farrer 
et al., 2008; Sirigu et al. 1999; Tsakiris et al., 2005). In a classic experiment, Van de 
Bos and Jeannerod asked participants to make one of several possible hand gestures 
and showed them, by means of a video setup, their own hand or that of an experi-
menter making the same or a different gesture. Additionally, the presented hands 
were also rotated, such that the participants or experimenter’s hand could appear to 
be facing down, up, left or right (van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002; see also Kannape 
et al., 2010, 2012). Their results indicated that when the participant and experimenter 
made different actions, almost no self-attribution errors occurred. However, when 
the actions were identical, the spatial orientation of the hand served as a strong cue 
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for self-attribution of that action to the self or the other – that is when the hand of 
the experimenter was shown in the same posture and from the same perspective as 
one’s own hand, participants more frequently misattributed that hand to themselves. 
Thus, although action-based self-attribution related to the forward model, proprio-
ceptive and spatial cues strongly affected self-judgments of the depicted actions when 
dynamic cues were non-informative.
Technological advances allowing more controlled manipulation of sensorimotor 
contingencies, such as computer-based control of the visual consequences of actions 
and real time video presentations, have increased our understanding of the sense of 
agency. The advantages inherent in these methods have now been combined with 
those of VR. Modern VR, including full body motion tracking and realistic avatar mod-
eling, offer an optimal environment to study the sense of agency and body ownership 
as well as their effect on presence. For instance, Salomon and colleagues (2013) used 
a visual search task with multiple full body avatars animated in real time, with one 
avatar mimicking the participants’ movements precisely while the others movements 
are spatially or temporally deviated. The participants had to find the avatar moving 
in accordance with their own movements among the distractor avatars when their 
movements were self-initiated or when being moved passively by the experimenter. 
The results showed that during self-initiated trials, the participants detected the self- 
avatar more rapidly, even when more distractor avatars were present.
Finally, VR has allowed studies to be extended beyond specific limb represen-
tations into full body representations of action in space. In a full body version of 
Nielsen’s and Jeannerod’s agency experiments, Kanappe and colleagues used full 
body tracking and avatar animation to test agency of locomotion. The results showed 
that we have limited conscious monitoring of our locomotive actions, indicating the 
limits of agency for full body motion (Kannape et al., 2010; see also Mentzer et al., 
2010 for a related paradigm using auditory-motor conflicts). Once again, the relation-
ship between technological advances in video and VR and the study of the sense of 
agency highlights the symbiosis between the study of the self and the emulation of 
self-related processes in virtual environments.
5.4.2  Body Ownership and Self-Location
The findings of the sense of agency over one’s own movements, however, does not 
sufficiently account for the experience of the embodied self, in particular of body 
ownership. Simply consider the example that another person is lifting your arm. You 
perceive no sense of agency, but a preserved sense of body ownership. Research has 
shown that the subjective feeling that this hand and body is mine originates from the 
integration of different sensory cues. This is difficult to test experimentally because 
of the complexity of manipulating the experience of one’s own body. In research on 
the awareness for external events, researchers can manipulate the sensory features 
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of external stimuli and then measure the effects of such manipulations on percep-
tual and neural mechanisms. In the case of body ownership, however, such a clas-
sical experimental approach is much more difficult for the simple reason, which is 
that the body is always present to the subject, as William James noticed. Some of 
the first insights on bodily self-consciousness arose from Ambroise Paré’s descrip-
tion in 1551 of the illusory presence of a missing limb, i.e., the ‘phantom limb’ expe-
rience frequently reported by amputee patients. Phantom limb phenomenon shows 
that the brain can generate the experience of a limb and body ownership (because 
phantom limbs generally are experienced as own limbs) even if the respective body 
part is absent. Neuroscientists, more than 400 years later, were able to experimen-
tally reproduce an analogous phenomenon, i.e., extending the sense of bodily own-
ership to an artificial object. In the so-called “rubber hand illusion”, synchronous 
stroking of a seen fake hand and of one’s own unseen (real) hand cause the fake hand 
to be attributed to the subject’s body (“I feel like it is my hand”; Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998; Ehrsson et al., 2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The rubber hand illusion is also 
associated with a misperception of the position of the participant’s own hand rela-
tive to the fake hand and even with changes in the physiology of one’s own hand. 
For instance, if a harmful stimulus suddenly approaches the rubber hand while the 
illusion occurs, subject’s skin conductance response increases (neurophysiological 
marker of increased arousal to a threat, see Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson 
et al., 2007). Others have reported a reduction in temperature of the real limb ‘percep-
tually’ substituted by the rubber hand (Moseley, Olthof et al., 2008). Sanchez-Vives 
and colleagues demonstrated the rubber hand illusion in VR by showing that illusory 
ownership of an artificial hand could be obtained when a virtual hand, instead of a 
rubber hand, is presented in a virtual environment (Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010). VR 
provided Evans and Blanke (2012) with the ability to induce illusory hand ownership 
in a systematic and computer-controlled manner, thus allowing for the simultaneous 
recording of high-density EEG, revealing that illusory ownership and motor imagery 
share the same neural substrates in fronto-parietal areas of the brain. Neuroimag-
ing techniques, such as fMRI (Ehrsson et al., 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2007), transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS; Kammers et al., 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2008), and elec-
troencephalography (EEG, Kanayama et al., 2007), have been applied to study the 
neural correlates of the rubber hand illusion, pointing to a fronto-parietal network 
of brain areas involving the premotor cortex and the posterior parietal cortex, which 
normally integrate multisensory stimuli (somatosensory, visual, auditory) occur-
ring on or close to the body. The experience of ownership of the rubber hand is also 
associated with activity in the (predominantly right) insular cortex, an area receiv-
ing multiple sensory inputs from ‘exteroceptive’ senses as well as from ‘interoceptive’ 
channels monitoring internal body states (Craig, 2009). These neuroimaging results 
are important in showing that body ownership is obtained though activation of brain 
regions that integrate multisensory body-related signals to construct multiple repre-
sentations of one’s own body.
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The paradigm generating the rubber hand illusion has also been extended to 
face perception. In the so-called ‘enfacement’ illusion, viewing another person’s face 
being touched while feeling touch on one’s own face results in perceiving the other 
person’s face as similar to one’s own (see Apps & Tsakiris, 2013 for a review; Sforza 
et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2008). Showing a change in the perception of one’ own 
face following such short sensory stimulation is particularly interesting, as one’s own 
face is the part of the body that most strongly defines one’s own visual identity and 
is shown to others during social interactions (Rochat & Zahavi, 2011). Self-face recog-
nition is considered an important component of self-consciousness, such that self-
face recognition in the mirror-test is considered a hallmark of self-consciousness in 
non-human species and in human infants (see, e.g., Gallup, 1970; Povinelli, 2001). 
A recent fMRI study investigating the neural correlates of the enfacement illusion 
has shown that it is generated by modulation of activity in the right temporo-parietal 
junction and intraparietal sulcus, areas that normally integrate multisensory body-
related information (Apps et al., 2013).
Thus, an abundance of evidence from both the rubber hand illusion and enface-
ment illusion has contributed to the establishment of some of the mechanisms which 
allow manipulating BSC. Specifically, synchronous multisensory inputs related to a 
part of the real body and to an artificial replacement of that body part activate brain 
areas, which normally integrate multisensory information related to one’s own body. 
Such stimulations induce an extension of the limits of BSC from the physical body to 
its artificial or virtual replacement. However, although these studies have important 
contributions to the understanding of BSC, they focus on separate (body part cen-
tered) representations of the body. On the contrary, a fundamental feature of self-con-
sciousness is that it is characterized by the experience of a single and coherent whole 
body rather than of multiple separated body parts. For this reason, Blanke (2012) 
proposed the concept of self-identification in order to reflect full-body ownership, 
as opposed to the feeling of ownership of single body parts. Lenggenhager and col-
leagues (2007) used VR technology to study this global aspect of BSC experimentally. 
In what it is referred to as the full body illusion, subjects see a virtual body (avatar) 
placed 2 meters in front of them while being stroked on their back (Lenggenhager 
et al., 2007). When the viewed and felt stroking is synchronous, participants report 
perceiving the virtual body as their own (change in self-identification) and feel dis-
placement toward the virtual body (change in self-location). Other variants of the full-
body illusion have been reported. For instance, in the so-called body swap illusion, 
participants observe, via head-mounted display and the first-person perspective, a 
mannequin being stroked on its chest, which is congruent with a stroking of their own 
chest (Ehrsson, 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). When interviewed about such expe-
rience, participants scored high on questions such as, ‘‘I had the impression that the 
fake body was my own body”, and they physiologically reacted strongly to harmful 
stimuli approaching the fake body (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008).
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Ionta, Heydrich, and colleagues (2011) used fMRI to study the neural mechanism 
of the full body illusion. They showed that self-location induced by synchronous 
stroking of the virtual body and of one’s own body activated the temporo-parietal 
junctions (TPJ). Interestingly, the focus of TPJ activity found in fMRI was close to the 
area of brain damage in nine patients suffering OBEs of neurological origin. Further, 
functional connectivity analyses of the fMRI data showed that right and left TPJ are 
bilaterally connected to the supplementary motor area, ventral premotor cortex, 
insula, intraparietal sulcus, and occipito-temporal cortex and that changes in self-
location modulated brain activity among right TPJ, right insula, and right supplemen-
tary motor area and between left TPJ and right insula (Ionta, Martuzzi et al., 2014). 
These recent data, together with the previously reviewed neuroimaging studies (see 
also Serino et al., 2013), point to an extended network of multisensory areas underly-
ing BSC, which involve premotor and posterior parietal cortices as well as the tempo-
ral parietal junction and the insula, predominantly in the right hemisphere.
5.5  Conclusion
The early VR developments were based on the concepts from cybernetics, that is, an 
artificial system which would be capable of emulating sensory inputs, thus remov-
ing the person from his/her true environment and placing him/her into an artificial 
one. This view initiated the quest for fully immersive systems, which would surround 
entirely the human body and its senses, transporting people into ‘cyberspace’. These 
technological developments in sensing, display, and immersion technologies have 
since evolved symbiotically with research on the cognitive mechanisms of presence.
The present selective review of recent literature in neurology and neurosci-
ence of bodily self-consciousness crucially highlights how new technologies have 
enabled experimental manipulations that contribute to the understanding of bodily 
self-consciousness and therefore of presence itself. In particular, these technologies 
offer novel methodological approaches, and they have provided researchers in neu-
roscience with unprecedented experimental opportunities for approaching high level 
and complex mechanisms of self-consciousness, such as agency, body ownership, 
and self-location. Research on these aspects of embodiment and bodily self-con-
sciousness, and the neural underpinnings of both, have been investigated in the last 
15 years, and are beginning to contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms 
of presence in VR. For instance, although the VR community has highlighted sen-
sorimotor contingency as the prominent factor for presence, neuroscience research 
shows that multisensory integration of bodily signals is also critical for the presence, 
embodiment, and related aspects of bodily self-consciousness.
As illustrated throughout this chapter, research on the cognitive neuroscience of 
bodily self-consciousness is gradually merging with the investigation of presence in 
VR. Neurological observations of altered bodily self-consciousness (employing VR 
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technologies) might eventually lead to a better understanding of self-consciousness 
in its most basic form, arising when the “I” of the conscious self declares to be present 
at a given place. While a definitive model of presence is yet to be achieved, cognitive 
neuroscience has enriched the field with novel paradigms, allowing qualification and 
quantification of the multisensory integrative mechanisms with which bodily self-
consciousness is constructed. This model of how the mind gives rise to our presence 
in the world promises to introduce original perspectives for approaching immersive 
embodiment systems.
When observing the increasing complex nature of human-computer confluence 
technologies, it appears that the evolution of research on the presence in VR can be 
seen as a precursor of how interactions within the digital world should be considered 
using a neurological perspective and how they may eventually shape our bodily self.
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